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Meanwhile, demand for safer food is growing, as consumers become more affluent, live longer, and better
understand the links between diet and health. Additionally, trade in food products is a larger source of supply
in may countries as both technical and trade barriers to food trade are reduced, and this can introduce new
sources of risk into the food supply. To ensure the safety of the food supply, many governments are mandating
the use of Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) systems in food industries. This paper
explores the controversies of mandated imposition of HACCP by examining the economic implications of
using HACCP in food safety regulation.
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The Economic Implications of Using HACCP as a Food Safety Regulatory Standard 
 
 
 Several trends are bringing greater attention to food safety regulation in many countries. 
Science is identifying new foodborne pathogens and understanding their potential for serious 
consequences. Demand for safer food is growing as consumers become more affluent, live 
longer, and better understand the links between diet and health. The proportion of food obtained 
from food services is increasing, even in middle income countries, and this reduces consumer 
control over food handling and preparation. International trade in food products is a larger source 
of supply in many countries as both technical and trade barriers to food trade are reduced, and 
this can introduce new sources of risk into the food supply. These trends converge to create both 
public and private demand for greater food safety. At the same time, governments everywhere are 
trying to make more efficient use of public resources. 
 Private markets often fail to provide for adequate food safety because the safety is not 
readily apparent to consumers and it is often very costly to test for the safety of product.  
Furthermore, producers or retailers may not be able to ascertain or certify the safety of foods 
given the wide array of microbial agents and their potential for hazard.  Without the ability to 
fully capture returns to costly control of product hazard, firms lack incentive to implement 
controls for food safety. 
As a result, many governments are taking a new approach to ensuring the safety of the 
food supply: mandated use of the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) system in 
food industries. Such a system focusses on verifiable control of the process.  For example, the 
European Union Directive 93/43, effective in December 1995, requires food companies to 
implement HACCP (Grijspaardt-Vink, 1995). In the United States, HACCP was mandated 
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through regulation for seafood in 1994, for meat and poultry in 1996, and proposed for fresh fruit 
juice in 1998, with regulations for other food industries expected in the future (Morris, 1997). 
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada also have mandatory or voluntary public programmes to 
encourage adoption of HACCP (Peters, 1997; Dean, 1990). As an outcome of its use in most 
developed countries, HACCP is increasingly practiced in less developed countries that export 
food products into industrialized markets (Merican, 1996). The growing use of HACCP as a 
sanitary standard in international trade led the Codex Alimentarius to adopt guidelines for 
HACCP in 1993, and to incorporate HACCP into food hygiene codes starting in 1995 
(Whitehead and Orriss, 1995). 
Despite the widespread enthusiasm for HACCP among regulatory and international 
agencies, there are several controversies surrounding mandatory imposition of HACCP. First, 
there is disagreement regarding how effectively HACCP will control or eliminate some food 
safety hazards, and whether it must be combined with specific product standards (Hathaway, 
1995). Second, there is controversy regarding whether it improves or reduces regulatory 
oversight (Smith-De Waal, 1996). Third, there is controversy regarding whether it allows firms to 
meet food safety objectives in the most efficient manner or whether it is overly prescriptive 
(Antle, 1998). Finally, there is disagreement regarding whether it can reasonably be used in place 
of sanitary performance standards in international trade (Hathaway and Cook, 1997). 
This paper explores these controversies by examining the economic implications of using 
of HACCP in food safety regulation. We focus on the mandated imposition of HACCP, which 
differs from its use as a private process control method or as a private means of certification. We 
begin by reviewing the concept of HACCP, then discuss the rationale for public intervention to 
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improve food safety outcomes. Then, we review how the economics of regulation applies to the 
HACCP system. This includes three related issues: 
•= the economic efficiency implications of mandating HACCP to improve food safety; 
•= the public agency motivation for adoption of  HACCP to reduce monitoring costs; and 
•= the difficulty of determining equivalence between HACCP standards for international trade. 
What Is HACCP? 
HACCP is widely recognised in the food industry as an effective approach to establishing 
good production, sanitation, and manufacturing practices that produce safe foods (Pierson and 
Corlett, 1992). HACCP systems establish process control through identifying points in the 
production process that are most critical to monitor and control. HACCP’s preventive focus is 
seen as more cost-effective than testing a product and then destroying or reworking it (ICMSF, 
1988). The system can be applied to control any stage in the food system, and is designed to 
provide enough feedback to direct corrective activities. 
 Seven principles are involved in developing and operating a HACCP program 
(NACMCF): 
1. assess the hazard, list the steps in the process where significant hazard can occur, and 
describe the prevention measures; 
2. determine critical control points (CCPs) in the process; 
3. establish critical limits for each CCP; 
4. establish procedures to monitor each CCP; 
5. establish corrective actions to be taken when monitoring indicates a deviation from the CCP 
limits; 
6. establish record keeping for the HACCP system; and 
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7. establish procedures to verify that the HACCP system is working correctly. 
 
By focussing inspection at CCPs, HACCP improves the scientific basis for safety and control 
processes. A CCP is “any point in the chain of food production from raw materials to finished 
product where the loss of control could result in unacceptable food safety risk” (Pierson and 
Corlett, 1992). Monitoring of CCPs is done best by using indicators that can be measured easily. 
This focus on measurable indicators provides a more cost-effective approach to control than 
product sampling and testing, which is more expensive and may not provide timely results. This 
is especially important for foodborne microbial pathogens, because their incidence is low and 
costs of testing are high. 
 It is important to recognise that HACCP is not designed to replace management decisions 
weighing potential benefits from product qualities against costs, or the value of improved safety 
versus the costs of achieving it. HACCP facilitates improved product safety, but management has 
discretion to determine what the final product quality will be. These issues enter into the firm’s 
deliberations in determining CCPs and tolerance limits at CCPs.   
 HACCP was originally developed as a quality control tool in food processing, where 
branded product liability creates industry incentives for hazard control. It was intended to be 
flexible enough to adapt to different firms, plants, or processes within plants. Its application as a 
regulatory standard to an entire industry or sector, or at different stages in the supply chain, is 
necessarily different. First, its mandate should be linked ideally to a system-wide risk assessment 
(NRC, 1985; Hathaway, 1995). This allows identification of the likely sources of hazards and the 
scientific basis for reducing them, so that regulation focusses on the most important sources of 
risk. Second, it may be explicitly linked with a particular regulated standard for food safety, 
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which has implications for setting critical limits at CCPs (Unnevehr and Jensen, 1996). Risk 
assessment and identification of the publicly desirable level of risk reduction have implications 
for the cost/benefit analysis of regulation and for recognition of HACCP in international trade, as 
will be discussed below. 
Rationale for Food Safety Regulation 
Food safety regulation may be justified by the existence of a failure in the market for 
safety attributes. Because consumers cannot ascertain the safety of many food products, they are 
unable to express preferences for greater safety in the marketplace. Furthermore, producers or 
retailers may be unable to ascertain or to certify safety because foodborne pathogens are living 
organisms that can enter the food at any point and may grow over time. The lack or high cost of 
information about safety and the resulting consequences for public health are the fundamental 
justifications for public intervention to improve food safety.   
Several studies have demonstrated the high costs to society of foodborne illness in 
different countries, including the United States (Buzby et al., 1996) and Canada (Dean, 1990). 
There is also a growing literature on the importance of reducing foodborne illness in developing 
countries (Motarjemi et al., 1996; Moy et al., 1997). These demonstrate that there may be large 
benefits to improving food safety, and that market mechanisms have not fully internalised these 
benefits to reward firms. 
However, the market failure in food safety is not total, because there are private 
incentives to improving food safety. These arise most clearly when foodborne illness is easily 
traced to a particular source, or when food safety is jointly produced with other attributes that 
have market value, such as product shelf life. Traceability is more likely for branded products or 
when a single identifiable source (e.g., restaurant chain) serves a large number of customers. 
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Sometimes these private incentives are passed back through the supply chain. Several studies 
have shown that food producers adopt HACCP in order to satisfy downstream customers 
(Mazzocco, 1996; Henson, et al., 1998). In addition, firms have incentives for HACCP adoption 
to prevent losses of reputation and market share should an outbreak occur.  Thus the challenge 
for regulators is to identify where intervention is justified to improve public health, i.e., where 
social benefits from reduced foodborne illness are not reflected in market incentives. This may be 
why the U.S. government has mandated HACCP for industries that sell raw, unbranded products 
to consumers (seafood, meat, and poultry; fresh fruit juices; and possibly fruits and vegetables in 
the future), because these are markets where producers cannot capture returns to improved safety. 
Choice of Efficient Regulatory Intervention 
 
Government intervention can take many forms. We distinguish between direct command 
and control (CAC) interventions and information-based interventions that provide incentives for 
private market solutions (Litan and Nordhaus, 1983; Ippolito, 1984). Direct interventions include 
CAC standards for performance, e.g., pathogen counts for products at some stage of the 
marketing channel. An example would be the salmonella standard for powdered milk (Hathaway, 
1995). Such standards require monitoring of the product’s quality, usually based on sampling and 
testing. In contrast, CAC processing standards achieve improved final product by directly 
specifying procedures to be followed in production. Examples of contamination control 
procedures include milk pasteurisation, specific product washing solutions, or chill temperatures. 
These are sometimes specified as Good Manufacturing Practices (GMPs), such as those required 
under the food codes in many European countries. A third type of CAC approach is mandatory 
disclosure of information. While it may be difficult to enforce disclosure of information about 
microbial pathogens because producers do not always know product safety levels, producers 
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could be required to provide information on any pathogen reduction processes that they use, such 
as irradiation. 
In contrast to CAC, incentive-based approaches are designed to induce either producers 
or consumers to identify and practice cost-effective methods that achieve improved food safety. 
Such interventions might include providing information to consumers to allow them to evaluate 
and avoid a hazard, lowering the costs of information through subsidizing development of new 
pathogen tests, or facilitating private contracting through public certification of products that 
meet a minimum safety standard. Establishing liability or the need for  “due diligence” makes 
clear the rights and responsibilities of the two parties to the implicit contract in a private sale.  
The environmental economics literature demonstrates that there is a hierarchy among 
regulatory approaches from an economic efficiency perspective (Cropper and Oates, 1992). The 
most desirable is an incentives-based approach that allows producers and consumers to choose 
the most efficient level of pollution. This is accomplished either by creating a market for the 
negative externality, e.g., tradeable pollution rights, or from the application of optimal pollution 
taxes. Incentives-based approaches are preferable to CAC, which reduces efficiency by 
constraining market choice. Among CAC approaches, process standards are less efficient than 
performance standards. They specify how firms should achieve pollution reduction goals rather 
than specifying a performance standard and allowing firms to choose the least expensive process 
for achieving it (Besanko, 1987). Setting performance standards and allowing choice of 
production methods and, over time, innovation to meet standards should allow greater efficiency 
in meeting a particular public health goal. Helfand (1991) demonstrated that setting a direct 
restriction on the level of pollution resulted in the highest level of profits and production 
efficiency among a set of five different performance and process standards. 
 8
However, there are many exceptions to these generalisations, and they may not apply to 
the market failure in food safety from microbial pathogens. Information-based approaches may 
not work simply because the main reason for the market failure is that information is very costly. 
Mandating the provision of information does not reduce its cost, and therefore may be a very 
expensive way to address the market failure in food safety. Ippolito (1984) argues that where 
quality information is costly or difficult to convey to consumers, and where there would be little 
informed demand for quality below a minimum standard, a CAC performance standard may be 
an appropriate choice. So if information interventions are impractical, then the choice is among 
CAC approaches. The difficulty for setting a CAC performance standard for microbial pathogens 
is again the high cost of testing for a hazard that often has a low incidence. Thus monitoring and 
enforcement of a performance standard can be costly.  
 
What Kind of Intervention is HACCP? 
It is the difficulty of measuring and monitoring microbial pathogen standards that has led 
governments to mandate HACCP systems as part of food safety regulation. Although HACCP 
appears to be a process standard, it is not as prescriptive as specifying GMPs. In fact, it embodies 
elements of both performance and process standards. First, HACCP focusses on measurable 
indicators at CCPs, which are demonstrated to achieve an explicit or implicit performance 
standard during the process of verification. The purpose of HACCP is to provide a means of 
overcoming the cost of establishing the level of food safety for each product, by substituting 
easily monitored control measures for direct tests to detect hazards (e.g., temperature instead of 
pathogen cultures). Second, HACCP implementation focusses on reducing hazards where they 
are most likely to occur and most effectively controlled, and thus encourages efficient resource 
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use in hazard control. HACCP implementation can be linked to a system-wide risk assessment to 
identify likely sources of hazards and the scientific basis for reducing them (NRC, 1985; 
Hathaway, 1995). Such risk assessment directs regulation, and resulting industry actions, towards 
the most important sources of risk. Third, HACCP allows firms a great deal of flexibility in 
designing and implementing controls to fit specific circumstances. Thus it is inherently more 
flexible than mandating specific processes.  
An important motivation for governments to adopt HACCP is that it also reduces the 
costs of regulatory enforcement. Monitoring costs are increasingly recognised as constraining 
regulatory options (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Just as HACCP provides a cost-effective way of 
monitoring quality control for private industry, it also may reduce the cost to a regulatory agency. 
 The agency can test product, but the costs of testing are quite high when the probability that a 
hazard will get into final product is relatively small (but not zero).  The agency can inspect 
frequently to ensure that GMPs are followed, but this is also costly in terms of agency resources. 
With a HACCP based regulation, the regulatory agency can review records periodically to verify 
that a HACCP program is working.   Such records include verification of processes and the 
effectiveness of controls.  Although shirking and avoidance may occur under any regulatory 
system, the enforcement costs of improving food safety may well be lower under HACCP. 
In practice, HACCP application in regulation has contained elements of process, 
performance, and information standards. In the European Union, it replaces more prescriptive 
regulation specifying GMPs, and thus gives firms greater flexibility. There is a general 
requirement now for food safety controls based on “HACCP principles” to be applied.  However, 
there are no specifics on what these systems should include, and some flexibility remains with 
member countries in the implementation.  In contrast, the U.S. has detailed requirements, 
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including both performance and process standards.  The U.S. meat and poultry regulation 
combines the HACCP requirements with required specification of Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) for sanitation, and a performance standard for the incidence of salmonella. 
Australia has provided public certification for exporting industries that use HACCP, thus 
facilitating information about safety procedures in the international marketplace.  
To sum up, HACCP has become a popular regulatory tool because it overcomes the high 
information costs of setting and enforcing standards for microbial foodborne pathogens. These 
information costs contribute to the market failure in food safety provision and make design of 
effective interventions difficult. However, HACCP must be tied to verification that it is actually 
reducing food safety risks in order for it be a useful substitute for a performance standard. This 
point relates to the difficulties of determining equivalence among HACCP standards in different 
countries. 
 
HACCP as a Standard in International Trade 
 Adoption of HACCP as a regulatory standard has been motivated first by food safety 
concerns, and only second by a desire to facilitate trade (Caswell and Hooker, 1996).  The 
process of facilitating trade will require mutual recognition of HACCP regulations across 
national boundaries.  One trend that may influence such recognition is the use of HACCP as a 
private standard for international trade.  The ISO 9000 certification series for food companies is 
being adapted for certification of private HACCP programmes.   Such private developments may 
facilitate eventual harmonization of HACCP regulation among countries. 
Harmonization takes place within the framework established by the 1994 GATT 
agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary standards.  This agreement seeks to reduce trade 
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conflicts and barriers for food products (Unnevehr, et al., 1994). It specifies that countries may 
set their own risk standards, but that these must be science-based, transparent, and applied 
equally to domestic and imported products. The agreement provides new mechanisms for dispute 
resolution and recognises the Codex Alimentarius as the mechanism for developing scientific 
consensus regarding sanitary standards. A key element in setting standards that will stand up in 
the dispute resolution process is carrying out a risk assessment of the hazard. Only then can a 
country defend that a particular sanitary standard is science-based and actually reduces risk. 
 The growing adoption of HACCP by many industrialised countries has led the Codex to 
consider guidelines for setting microbiological safety criteria and for establishing HACCP 
programmes. One difficulty in setting these criteria is that there is no internationally agreed upon 
procedure for carrying out a microbiological risk assessment (ICMSF, 1997). In the absence of 
such an agreement, the Codex has recommended the application of HACCP as the preferred 
method for ensuring microbiological safety. In fact, the ICMSF explicitly recognises HACCP or 
good practices as a substitute for explicit microbiological standards (ICMSF, 1997, p.120; 
ICMSF, 1998). Hathaway (1995)has challenged this view that HACCP requirements can 
substitute for explicit microbiological criteria. He argues that HACCP should provide some 
quantifiable risk reduction, not merely the assurance that hazards have been reduced by some 
unspecified amount.  
 These opposing views relate to a critical issue for international food trade: How will 
equivalence among HACCP regimes in different countries be determined?  For example, can 
seafood produced under HACCP in Thailand be exported to the United States, where HACCP is 
mandated for domestic producers?  Or, will it be necessary to specify microbiological criteria and 
actual risk levels that HACCP should achieve?  In practice, both microbiological criteria and the 
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existence of process controls will likely be considered (Kvenberg, 1998). But the extent to which 
HACCP will substitute for imported product testing is likely to be an area of controversy in 
international food trade for the foreseeable future.  
 Such controversy may well be most contentious in trade between developing and 
industrialised countries. Developing countries that export to industrialised markets must meet 
their HACCP standards. The marginal costs of implementing HACCP may be higher in 
developing countries, where fewer basic sanitation services are available, and technical 
assistance may be required because there are few trained HACCP specialists (Cato and Dos 
Santos, 1998). But sanitary standards may also discourage production in countries unable to 
certify HACCP systems or encourage multinationals to invest in food processing in order to 
control quality and safety throughout the food chain.  Thus, sanitary regulation is likely to 
influence the structure of international food trade, in the same way that it may influence the 
structure of food processing in industrialized nations, as we discuss below. 
 
Measuring the Impacts of HACCP Regulation 
An important question is whether HACCP is a more cost-effective approach to achieving 
improved food safety than alternative approaches. The economic impacts of HACCP regulation 
have been studied in the United States, where an executive order mandates such cost benefit 
analysis for regulation. Presumably it is of interest to consider these effects wherever HACCP 
has been mandated, and thus some of the generalisations from the U.S. literature may provide 
guidance about the expected impacts in other countries and help to clarify the unanswered 
questions.  
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Cost estimates of HACCP implementation show that costs are significant, but usually 
modest in relation to total industry costs (e.g., Crutchfield et al., 1997; Jensen, Unnevehr, and 
Gomez, 1998).  A key area of uncertainty is whether firms must modify their processes or adopt 
new processes to control microbial pathogens, which increases costs.  However, the direct costs 
of HACCP are likely to be overshadowed by the implications of HACCP for long run industry 
structure.  The large investments and technical skills needed for implementation have economies 
of scale that favor larger firms (MacDonald and Crutchfield, 1996). The fixed costs of adding 
control technologies and for HACCP training may be prohibitively large for small firms.  Thus 
its mandate may pose a greater burden on small firms, and lead to further concentration in the 
processing industry.  Some observers have suggested a need for public education directed 
towards small firms. Others have suggested that there are operating efficiencies to be gained once 
HACCP is in place, through better organisation of labour or processes (Mazzocco, 1996; Henson, 
et al., 1998), which small firms could capture if they overcome initial adoption costs.  However, 
it is clear that there are economies of scale in the human capital needed to implement HACCP, 
and thus its imposition will favor larger firms. 
In addition to greater food industry concentration, HACCP regulations may also create  
incentives for greater vertical coordination to control food safety throughout the production 
process.   Rather than testing product as it is delivered, it may be less expensive to contract or 
control production processes upstream (Mazzocco, 1996).  These incentives dovetail with other 
emerging forces favoring greater coordination, such as increased demand for uniformity of 
product or for specific quality characteristics to meet niche market demand (Hennessy, 1996).  
Thus HACCP regulations will reinforce these two structural trends for food industries in 
industrialized countries. 
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The benefits of mandating HACCP arise from reduced foodborne illness. These are more 
difficult to estimate for two reasons. First, there is controversy about the appropriate 
methodology for valuing suffering and loss of life (Buzby et al., 1996; Van Ravenswaay and 
Hoehn, 1997). Second, there is no evidence yet available regarding the actual reduction in risk 
from mandating HACCP for an entire industry or portion of the food production chain. 
Crutchfield et al. (1997) have argued that the potential benefits are so large in the United States 
that they offset the costs, but the question of how much HACCP really improves food safety 
remains to be answered. We need to know how HACCP ultimately affects foodborne illness 
risks, particularly when it is mandated at only one point in the food chain. The difficulties in 
measuring benefits means that it may not be possible to find a regulatory standard that equates 
marginal costs with marginal benefits.  
 
Conclusions  
HACCP is a different kind of regulation or intervention from those previously examined 
by the economics literature. It was developed as a private management tool for specific 
processes. Now it is being mandated for entire industries, which requires more explicit risk 
assessment in order to link HACCP mandates to desired public health outcomes. Performance 
standards for food safety under mandatory HACCP may only be determined implicitly through 
the accompanying process of risk assessment. As a public policy tool, HACCP combines 
elements of process and performance standards. 
HACCP is increasingly adopted as a regulatory standard because it provides a way to 
overcome high costs of monitoring safety outcomes and provides firms with some flexibility in 
approach. Whether it substitutes for, or must be supplemented by, a performance standard for 
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microbial risk is a current area of controversy. When it substitutes for a performance standard, 
there is a danger that its implementation may fall back upon specifying GMPs, and hence it will 
become a de facto process standard. Without an accompanying performance standard, 
equivalence of HACCP regulations in international trade may be difficult to establish. 
Economists would like to measure the impact of HACCP regulations to evaluate whether 
this approach is more cost-effective than alternative regulatory approaches to improving food 
safety. In other words, does it promote the most efficient market solution to improving food 
safety? This evaluation will be difficult in practice, especially because risk assessment of 
microbial hazards is still in its infancy (Hathaway and Cook, 1997). As long as the cost of 
directly monitoring microbial pathogens remains high, HACCP will continue to be the standard 
of choice because it focusses resources where they will have greatest effect in controlling 
hazards.  
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